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Geode Capital Management: voting policy and stewardship reports

Geode Capital Management’s published proxy voting policy, edition by edition.

Voting policy

The firm’s own guidelines for how it votes, held in the policy library. Each edition is listed by the date on its own cover, or its effective date, not by the year it was collected.

2026 Geode Capital Management voting policy, 2026
PDF · dated February 2026 · publisher’s copy
2025 Geode Capital Management voting policy, 2025
PDF · dated February 2025 · publisher’s copy

What changed between editions

What changed from the 2025 edition to the 2026 edition

A comparison of the two editions, checked against them: every quotation below was found in the edition named, on the page given. It describes what the policy documents say, not how the manager voted. Read the 2025 and 2026 editions for the full picture. Reviewed 2026-11-19.

Both are Geode Capital Management's proxy voting policy, the 2025 and 2026 editions. The 2026 edition keeps the same structure and most rules, with targeted changes to director accountability for pay, equity plans and anti-takeover items. The changes a voter most needs to know: the compensation committee chair can now be opposed when a say-on-pay proposal is on the ballot but fails to address concerns, or when the board picks a longer say-on-pay frequency than the one shareholders backed; single-trigger equity vesting is no longer an automatic reason to oppose employment agreements.

  • TightenedDirector accountabilityThe 2026 edition adds a second trigger for voting against the compensation committee chair: the board chose a longer say-on-pay frequency than the one that received a majority of votes. The 2025 edition named only a low-support say-on-pay vote.
    “Geode will vote AGAINST the chair of the compensation committee when there is insufficient responsiveness to a say -on-pay vote that received less than 70% support at the last annual general meeting.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 5
    “a say-on-pay frequency vote that received a majority of votes for one frequency and the board chose a longer frequency.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 5
  • TightenedExecutive payThe 2025 edition opposed the compensation committee chair over pay concerns only when no say-on-pay proposal was on the ballot. The 2026 edition also opposes the chair when a say-on-pay proposal is on the ballot but fails to address concerns.
    “(i.e. the company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required by applicable regulation or the company’s declared policy; there is a pattern of awarding excessive non -employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors), and there is no say-on-pay proposal on the ballot.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 6
    “b. Say-on-Pay proposal is on the ballot but fails to address concerns (e.g. excessive non -employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors).”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 6
  • LoosenedExecutive payThe 2025 edition voted against new or amended employment agreements with single-trigger equity vesting. The 2026 edition applies that rule to single-trigger cash vesting and weighs single-trigger equity vesting together with problematic pay practices.
    “Geode will vote AGAINST new or materially amended employment agreements containing single- trigger equity vesting or repricing of securities without shareholder approval within the prior year.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 8
    “Geode will vote AGAINST new or materially amended employment agreements containing single- trigger cash vesting, or repricing or replacement of securities without shareholder approval within the prior year. Single-trigger equity vesting will be considered in conjunction with problematic pay practices.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 9
  • LoosenedExecutive payThe definition of an excessive golden parachute, used to oppose the compensation committee chair and severance payments, now refers to change-in-control cash severance that is not double-triggered; accelerated equity payments may be treated as excessive but are reviewed alongside other adverse circumstances.
    “a. cash severance payment is greater than three times salary and bonus b. change-in -control severance payments are not double triggered”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 5
    “b. change-in-control cash severance payments are not double triggered; or c. excise tax gross-ups are allowed. Acceleration of equity payments may be considered excessive but will be reviewed considering the presence of other adverse circumstances.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 6
  • LoosenedEquity plansThe 2026 edition adds an exception to the stock option plan rule: where dilution and burn rate are excessive but there is bankruptcy risk or going concern issues, the manager votes for the plan. The 2025 edition had no such exception.
    “Dilu tion is considered excessive (as defined below) and t he company grants annual awards at a rate higher than a benchmark burn rate considered appropriate for the company's GICS classification”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 7
    “2. Dilution and burn rate are considered excessive (as defined below). However, where dilution and burn rate are considered excessive, and there’s either bankruptcy risk or going concern issues, Geode will vote FOR.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 8
  • TightenedEquity plansThe 2026 edition extends the equity plan and option-repricing rules from repricing to the replacement of underwater options, so plans allowing replacement, or boards that replaced options without shareholder approval, now draw a vote against.
    “5. The plan’s terms allow repricing of underwater options, or th e b oard/committee has repriced options outstanding under the plan in the past two years without shareholder approval.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 8
    “5. The plan’s terms allow repricing or replacement of underwater options, or the board/committee has repriced or replaced options outstanding under the plan in the past two years without shareholder approval.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 8
  • TightenedDirector accountabilityThe compensation committee chair is now opposed where the board repriced or replaced underwater options held by officers or directors for stock, cash or other consideration without shareholder approval; the 2025 edition named repricing only.
    “4. Repriced Options. Geode will vote AGAINST the chair of the compensation committee in the concurrent or next following vote if, within the last year and without shareholder approval, the company’s board of directors or compensation committee has repriced underwater options.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 5
    “compensation committee has repriced or replaced underwater options for stock, cash or other consideration held by officers or directors.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 6
  • TightenedBoard independenceThe 2025 edition opposed a non-independent nominee who sat on the audit, compensation or nominating committee or where none of these committees existed. The 2026 edition opposes such a nominee where the board lacks any of the key committees.
    “(2) the Nominee is not independent and sits on the audit, compensation or nominating committee (or none of these committees exist).”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 5
    “(2) the Nominee is not independent and either sits on a key committee or the board lacks any of the key committees.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 5
  • LoosenedShareholder rightsThe 2025 edition voted against any authorization of blank check preferred stock. The 2026 edition votes against it only when the issuance would be used for anti-takeover purposes without shareholder approval.
    “2. Blank Check Preferred Stock. Vo te AGAINST a uthorization of “Blank Check” Preferred Stock.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 9
    “2. Blank Check Preferred Stock. Vote AGAINST a uthorization of “Blank Check” Preferred Stock when the issuance would be used for anti-takeover purposes without shareholder approval.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 10
  • TightenedMergers & capitalThe reincorporation rule now covers moves to another jurisdiction rather than another state, and the 2026 edition says the manager will consider whether new articles or bylaws amount to material diminution of shareholder rights and protections.
    “7. Reincorporation. Vote AGAINST r eincorporation in another state (when”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 10
    “In assessing reincorporation proposals, Geode will consider adoption of new articles of incorporation or bylaws which amount to material diminution of shareholder rights and protections.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 11
  • TightenedDual-class sharesThe vote against the nominating/governance committee chair over unequal voting rights now applies to a capital stock structure rather than only a common stock structure.
    “if the Company maintains a common stock structure with unequal voting rights.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 6
    “if the company maintains a capital stock structure with unequal voting rights.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 6
  • LoosenedMergers & capitalThe 2025 edition supported management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock. The 2026 edition supports management proposals to adjust par value, with the same case-by-case review where anti-takeover concerns arise.
    “D. Reduce Par Value of Common Stock. Geode will vote FOR management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock.”— 2025 edition, PDF p. 11
    “D. Adjust Par Value of Common Stock. Geode will vote FOR management proposals to adjust the par value of common stock.”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 11
  • AddedStewardship processThe 2026 edition adds a securities lending section: the manager typically does not recall loaned securities to vote but may recall them case by case where the value of the vote outweighs the loan revenue.
    “While Geode typically does not recall securities on loan for voting purposes because it views the revenue of the loan to be greater than the potential long -term financial value from the vote itself, Geode, in acting as a fiduciary for its clients, may determine on a”— 2026 edition, PDF p. 2